Time Consistency and Seller Commitment in Inter-temporal Movie Distribution: An Empirical Study of the Video Window

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### Overview

- Empirical study of the determinants of the U.S. "video window" (days from theatrical opening to video street date).
- **Overall question**: How have movie distributors maintained video window (at about 6 months for 1988-97 study period)?

### • Motivating example

Movie Title	Dist/date	Box office rev.	Theater run (days)	Out-of – market days	Video window
Father of the Bride 2	Disney, 1996	\$76 m	140	46	186
Screamer	Sony, 1996	\$6 m.	21	158	179

• Working Hypothesis: Coordinated behavior by U.S. distributors to maintain windows above competitive levels.



### Graphic





### **The Time Consistency Problem**

- The timed movie release sequence as inter-temporal price discrimination (theater→video→pay TV....)
- The general inability of sellers of durable goods to price discriminate over time unless they can commit to a minimum time before price is reduced.
- Movie consumers anticipate video windows based on some *average* of video windows for movies in the past.
- An individual movie distributor has an incentive to shorten the window to take advantage of freshness of the movie/ad campaign and to get revenues sooner.
- With fully competitive behavior, windows would thus tend to collapse—openly discussed by distributors.

# **Coping with Time Consistency**

- In most EU countries, industry agreements have maintained video windows (6 or 8 months in mid-90s); legislation in some countries, including France
- In the U.S., trade press references to "unspoken agreement" to maintain a 6 month window; industry coordination is plausible;
- Presumably, industry collusion/coordination to maintain windows would be socially beneficial.

# **Theoretical literature**

- Original time consistency insight: Coase (1972)
- Formalized by Bulow (1982); Stokey (1981)
- Commitment devices: Coase (1972); Bulow (1982); Tirole (1988); Butz (1990); Ausubel and Denereke (1987); Takeyama (2002);

-leasing; buybacks; best price provisions, firm reputation; destruction or capacity limitation; quality differentiation; discipline of competitors

Intertemporal price discrimination: Stokey (1979); Varian (1989)



# **Industry-related studies**

- Rosen and Rosenfield (1997); live theater
- Frank (1994): German video windows
- Prasad, Bronnerberg and Mahajan (2004): video release timing
- Nelson, Reid, and Gilmore (2007): DVD out-of-market gap

### Database

- Main sources: Video Store Magazine; A.C. Nielsen EDI; Kagan Research
- 1429 theatrical films, released on video in U.S. from 1988 to 1997
- Criteria for inclusion: wholesale video volume of 50,000+; all movies with at least \$1 million box-office and 24 screens at widest reach; video window of 365 days or less.

## Methods

- Evaluate descriptive data for signs of successful coordination (minimum benchmarks, stability over time, response to external forces)
- Test if MPAA and non-MPAA (independent) distributors behave differently.
- How do VCR diffusion, interest rates, box-office performance, production costs, other economic variables affect windows?
- Test predictions of a no-commitment, competitive model vs. a full-commitment, industry coordination model.



### **Window Means**





### Window Frequency (I)

Video Release Year = 1997





### The "Out-of-Market" Gap in Relation to Theater Run Lengths

Averages for 1988-1997



···●··· Average of THEATER CLOSE TO VIDEO RELEASE — → Average of 95% OF BOX-OFFICE TO VIDEO RELEASE

### **Descriptive data summary**

- No minimum benchmarks evident—wide dispersion around the mean
- Relatively consistent mean over time, declining variance
- Long out-of-market periods for shorter run movies not readily explained by "natural" factors

### For the individual distributor of a movie

# (1) $\Pi = (P_T - C_T) A_T + (1 + d)^{-W} (P_V - C_V) A_V - K$

 $P_T, P_{V:}$ theater, video prices; $C_T, C_V$ :theater, video costs per capitad:time discount of the distributor;W:the window,K:movie production cost $A_T, A_V$ :theater, video demand.

## Continued

(2) 
$$A_T = A_T (W^e, W, P_T, P_W, V-T, S, Z)$$

(3) 
$$A_V = A_V (W^e, W, P_T, P_V, V-T, S, Z)$$

- *W<sup>e</sup>* : the distribution of consumers' commonly ` expected window
- V-T: general revenue potential of the video market relative to the theatrical market
- *S* : season of release
- *Z* : vector of individual movie characteristics

### Continued

(4) 
$$W^{e} = W^{e} (\Omega, P_{T} - C_{T}, P_{V} - C_{V}, V - T, d, Z, S)$$

 $\Omega$ : consumer past experience with windows.

In equilibrium,  $W^e = W$ ,

(5) 
$$W^* = W^* (P_T - C_T, P_V - C_V, V - T, d, Z, S)$$



### **Basic empirical model**

Video Window = f { VCR penetration ( - ), box-office revenues (+/-), production cost ( - ), real interest rate ( - ), non-MPAA membership dummy ( - ), number of theaters in widest release ( - ), seasonal dummies, genre dummies (?) length of theater run (+)}

Key Variations: *Out-of-market gap in place of Video Window; length of theater run defined as date 95% revenues earned* 



# **Summary of empirical effects on video window (full sample)**

VCR penetration: box-office revenues: production costs: real interest rates: non-MPAA dummy: number of theaters: seasonal dummies: genre dummies: theater run:  $(adj. R^2 = .20)$ 

negative insignificant negative negative negative (25-27 days) insignificant mostly insignificant mostly insignificant positive

## **Subsample definitions**

• Movies having theater runs of:

(a) under 11 weeks: commitment clearly relevant

• 1-70 days + 63 days = 1 - 133 days, vs. mean window of 184 days

(b) 11-17 weeks: commitment may be relevant

• 77-119 days + 63 days = 140 - 182 days

(c) 17+ weeks:commitment probably not relevant

# Predictions for commitment-relevant Subsamples

- "No commitment" model → window is positively related to theater run length; unrelated to out-of-market gap; economic variables significant
- **"Full commitment" model**  $\rightarrow$  window is independent of theater run length; out-of-market gap is inversely related (*b*= -1) to theater run length; economic variables insignif.





### **Subsample Results: Key Variables**

	Window	Window	Out-of-market gap	Out-of-market gap @95% Rev.
Under-11 week thea	ter runs (N = 410)			
Theater run	-0.32 (1.8)*		-1.32 ( 7.6)**	
Theater run @95% Rev.		-0.06 (0.3)		-1.06 (4.2)**
Adj R-sq	0.04	0.03	0.15	0.06
11-17 week theater i	runs (N = 363)			
Theater run	-0.21 (1.3)		-1.21 ( 7.3)**	
Theater run @95% Rev.		0.09 (0.5)		-1.09 (6.0)**
Adj R-sq	0.08	0.08	0.19	0.11
Over-17 week theate	er runs (N = 384)			
Theater run	0.43 (9.9)**		-0.57 (13.3)**	
Theater run @95% Rev.		0.46 (7.5)		-0.54 (8.8)**
Adj R-sq	0.38	0.32	0.46	0.27



## **Summary of Main results**

- Descriptive data suggest window benchmarks (at about 180 days) maintained over time from 1988-97, but high variance around mean for individual movies.
- For the full sample, econometric models show: VCR penetration somewhat shortened windows over time; Windows for independents shorter (25-27 days)
  Windows somewhat reduced by higher interest rates and higher production costs
- For movies having shorter, commitment-relevant run lengths, models show:

Windows unrelated to theater run lengths; out-of-market gaps inversely related to run lengths; robust to alternative definitions



Figure 6: Trends in the Average U.S. Video Window, 1988-2007 (Days between Theater and Video release)



Source: Waterman(2005), Hollywood Roads to Riches, Appendix E, Motion Picture Investor, Kagan Research

PRELIMINARY; David Waterman / Sangyong Han, CITI, December 12, 2008

### Conclusions

- Results support our primary hypothesis that U.S. motion picture distributors including independents) resolve time-consistency by coordinating their behavior to maintain longer windows than would result from a competitive model in which consumer expectations are ignored.
- In general, empirical results consistent with a loosely coordinated window benchmark model over the period.

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### **Video Windows in Europe (1994-96)**

Mo.	Window setting method
6	industry agreement (fixed by contract for each release)
6	industry agreement (follows French and Dutch patterns)
6	industry agreement
12	statute (12 months by law, but 6 months if total box-office admissions are under 100,000; if admissions under 400,000, a derogation may be applied for)
6	industry agreement ("voluntary," but 6 months is mandatory for state-subsidized films; distributors "nearly always stick" to the 6 months on non-subsidized movies.
6	industry agreement
6	industry agreement
8	statute/industry agreement (until 1994, one year; set at 8 months by law in 1994, with conditions set for derogations.
6	industry agreement
6	industry agreement ("strictly adhered to")
12	statute
6	industry agreement (fixed on a case-by-case basis within guidelines: mandatory 6 months on subsidized films until 1996, when shortened from 6 to 4 months
6	industry agreement ("fairly relaxed")
4-6	industry agreement ("not compulsory")
6	industry agreement
	Mo. 6 6 12 6 6 6 8 6 6 12 6 12 6 4 6 6 4 6 6 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 6 6 6 7 7 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

Source: Paul Kagan Associates, *Kagan's European Home Video, 1994; Euromedia Regulation,* Feb. 21, 1996.

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# The Video Window: Descriptive Statistics (number of days)

Video year	Obs	Mean	Median.	Variance	Var/Mean
1988	120	185.6	191.0	3163.9	17.0
1989	134	198.5	194.0	2578.1	13.0
1990	130	187.4	183.5	2082.6	11.1
1991	136	185.2	175.5	2095.5	11.3
1992	132	189.7	187.0	1778.6	9.4
1993	142	186.1	184.5	1813.1	9.7
1994	156	180.9	177.0	1233.8	6.8
1995	142	180.6	179.0	1145.9	6.3
1996	164	179.8	179.0	2030.0	11.3
1997	173	174.5	172.0	1488.8	8.5
Overall	1429	184.3	180.0	1930	10.5



# Mean and Median of Window-Related Variables (number of days)

Video year	Theater open Video to theater close		Theater open to 95% of box- office*		Theater close to video release		95% of box- office* to video release	
	mean	median	mean	median	mean	median	mean	median
1988	84.8	70.0	60.8	49.0	100.8	101.5	124.8	123.5
1989	84.9	70.0	58.6	49.0	113.6	117.0	140.0	137.0
1990	93.6	84.0	59.8	49.0	93.8	95.0	127.6	122.0
1991	102.2	84.0	64.3	56.0	83.0	94.0	120.9	123.0
1992	96.8	98.0	63.7	63.0	92.9	94.5	125.9	124.5
1993	100.5	94.5	64.9	56.0	85.6	83.0	121.1	117.0
1994	100.1	94.5	60.6	56.0	80.8	82.0	120.3	117.0
1995	119.4	112.0	64.5	56.0	61.3	67.0	116.1	123.0
1996	114.1	101.5	56.9	49.0	65.8	67.0	122.9	122.5
1997	116.8	112.0	60.5	49.0	57.6	60.0	114.0	116.0
Overall	102.3	91.0	61.4	56.0	82.1	83.0	123.0	123.0

\*95% of box-office: the date by which 95% of the movie's eventual total box-office receipts have been earned

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### **Descriptive Statistics for Basic Independent Variables (I)**

Variable	Mean	Median	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
VCRPEN	69.1	-	_	_	-
1988	50.6	-	-	-	-
1989	58.9	-	-	-	-
1990	63.6	-	-	-	-
1991	66.3	-	-	-	-
1992	68.7	-	-	-	-
1993	70.9	-	-	-	-
1994	72.2	-	-	-	-
1995	74.2	-	-	-	-
1996	77.5	-	-	-	-
1997	79.6	-	-	-	-
BOXTOTAL	27.2	15.3	34.7	1.0	312.2
1988	23.0	13.8	28.1	1.2	164.2
1989	24.9	11.8	34.8	1.1	251.2
1990	23.3	12.4	28.3	1.1	138.1
1991	30.6	15.6	43.3	1.0	281.6
1992	27.0	16.4	31.0	1.0	162.8
1993	27.3	14.4	31.6	1.1	172.7
1994	21.6	15.3	21.2	1.2	102.2
1995	28.5	17.5	38.2	1.0	312.2
1996	29.5	17.2	36.3	1.0	241.7
1997	33.8	18.1	43.5	1.0	260.3

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### **Descriptive Statistics for Basic Independent Variables (II)**

Variable	Mean	Median	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
MAXSCREEN	1294.9	1307.5	673.6	$\begin{array}{c} 25.0 \\ 49.0 \\ 54.0 \\ 31.0 \\ 75.0 \\ 25.0 \\ 25.0 \\ 126.0 \\ 40.0 \\ 34.0 \end{array}$	3565.0
1988	1042.4	1117.0	488.2		2562.0
1989	1073.6	1118.0	543.5		2837.0
1990	1098.3	1095.0	583.5		2332.0
1991	1191.0	1230.5	579.6		2509.0
1992	1186.2	1223.0	619.1		2644.0
1993	1324.4	1391.0	606.2		2491.0
1994	1315.9	1406.5	648.4		2748.0
1995	1422.7	1491.5	697.7		2893.0
1996	1543.5	1635.0	684.6		3012.0
1997	1567.5	1745.0	871.9	49.0	3565.0
REAL_INT	1.9	2.3	1.8	-1.3	5.5
1988	2.9	2.8	0.4	2.5	4.0
1989	4.6	4.6	0.7	2.5	5.5
1990	4.1	4.1	0.3	3.6	5.5
1991	2.6	2.8	0.9	0.6	4.1
1992	0.2	-0.1	0.7	-1.3	1.5
1993	-1.1	-1.1	0.2	-1.3	-0.4
1994	-0.3	-0.6	0.7	-1.1	1.4
1995	2.3	2.6	0.6	1.0	3.0
1996	2.2	2.2	0.2	1.8	2.6
1997	2.3	2.2	0.1	2.1	2.5

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# **Descriptive Statistics for Basic Independent Variables (III)**

Variable	Mean	Median	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
PRODCOST	21.8	17.0	18.1	0.0	175.0
1988	13.5	12.0	9.3	1.7	58.0
1989	14.1	14.0	7.5	2.0	50.0
1990	16.0	13.0	11.0	0.5	55.0
1991	20.3	17.0	14.7	0.3	95.0
1992	20.1	16.5	14.0	2.5	80.0
1993	20.7	18.0	12.4	2.5	65.0
1994	23.2	20.0	15.5	3.0	77.0
1995	27.2	23.5	19.8	0.0	90.0
1996	29.8	24.0	24.2	0.0	175.0
1997	33.6	25.0	28.8	0.3	145.0



### **Characteristics of MPAA and Non-MPAA distributed Movies**

Variable	IND-DUM=1		IND-E	DUM=0	ALL
	Obs	Mean	Obs	Mean	Obs Mean
WINDOW THEATER OPEN TO THEATER	83	168.0	1346	185.3	1429 184.3
CLOSE	83	93.8	1346	102.8	1429 102.3
THEATER OPEN TO 95% OF BOX	83	65.1	1346	61.1	1429 61.4
THEATER CLOSE TO VIDEO	83	74.2	1346	82.5	1429 82.1
95% OF BOX TO VIDEO	83	102.9	1346	124.2	1429 123.0
PRODCOST	54	8.1	1108	22.5	1162 21.8
BOXTOTAL	83	6.7	1346	29.6	1429 28.3
MAXSCREEN	83	669.4	1329	1334.0	1412 1294.9



### **Typical Domestic Theatrical Release Sequence**



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### Window Frequencies (II)





### **The Video Announcement Period**





## Video Announcement Date Less Theater Close Date





## Video Announcement Date Less 95% of Theater Box-office Date



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### The "Out-of-Market" Gap Less the Mean Announcement Period, in Relation to Theater Run Lengths



· · ● · · Average of ((VO- TC) - mean of (VO- ANNO)) → Average of ((VO- BOX95%) - mean of (VO- ANNO))