# The Economics of Digital Business Models

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### **Digital Business Models**

- A General Framework
- Three « Coordination » Dimensions
- Matching: Digital Networks as "Markets"
- Assembling: Digital Networks as "Production Capabilities"
- Knowledge Management:
  Digital Netwk. as Knowledge sharing tools

### The Economics of Platforms


- No disintermediation with digital networks
- Standardized interfaces, but still coordination costs
  - Matching
  - Assembling (ensuring interoperability; ensuring adequation to needs)
  - Access to information and knowledge
- => Platforms to assemble components and adapt digital goods to user needs
- Beyond infomediaries, beyond sole Internet based models

### <u>The Economics of Digital Business</u> <u>Models: A General Framework</u>

A *business model* is a way of organizing exchanges and of allocating various costs and revenues streams such that the production and exchange of a good or service becomes viable, in the sense of being able to sustain itself on the basis of the income it generates


### Digital Activities as Modular Activities

- *Digital goods and services are of a modular nature* (Lancaster, Economides)
- Digital activities are characterized by three basic operations
  - Production of Functionalities
  - Assembling of Functionalities into Services
  - Consumption of Services
- Users (or consumers) are not neutral in the process of value creation
  - Consumption Generates Information
  - Consumers can self-assemble Services



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### <u>A "Fractal" Approach to Digital</u> <u>Goods and BM</u>




### Three « Coordination » Dimensions

•Matching: *Digital Networks as "Markets"* Transaction Costs & Meeting Efficiency

•Assembling: Digital Networks as "Production Capabilities"

Assembling Costs, Adaptation to Users Needs and Value extraction strategy

•Knowledge Management: Digital Netwk. as Knowledge sharing tools Extraction & Accumulation of Info. and Knowledge



### <u>3 Dimensions to Contrast DBM</u>


#### Matching

Transaction Costs Network Externalities

Assembling Differentiation Economies of Scale Knowledge Mgmt

Incentives/Diffusion Access and Quality

### <u>3 Dimensions to Contrast DBM</u>



### II. Three Related Literatures

Matching


Market Micro-structure -Intermediation (e.g. Spulber) -Two-sided-Markets (e.g. Rochet-Tirole)

#### Assembling

-Economics of Networks (e.g. Economides) -Eco of Quality (Differentiation, Bundling, etc.) -Organization & Strategy: Mass Customization. RBV Knowledge Mgmt


-Economics of Knowledge -Intellectual Property Rights Eco. -Eco of On-Line Communities (self-regulation, self-organization, information feedbacks, etc.)

### <u>The Economics of Intermediation:</u> <u>Transaction & Matching Efficiency</u> <u>(Market Microstructure)</u>



1 The Economics of Commercial Intermediation: *Externalities among functions* 


2 Two Sided Markets: Externalities among agents



#### **Transactional Tradeoffs Bundling of Coordination** Services Provision **Integrated Intermediaries Economies of Bundling** (Cross-Subzidization + Lower Transaction Costs) "Intermediation Factor: Bilateral Market" Structure customization needs Competition Monopoly Ability to "Organize" Exchange Lower charges of intermediation Rent Capture Differentiation Economies of Scale Network Effects **Economies of Specialization** (Outsourcing + Competition) Factors: Heterogeneity of Preferences (and competition in **Un-intermediated Exchanges** supply)

## <u>The Economics of Assembling:</u> <u>Qualitative Matching in a</u>





### The economics of Assembling

### • Assumptions

- Competition among packages with contrasted differentiation and pricing capabilities due to the nature of the core modules
- Quality dilemma:

Diversity vs. Interoperability (user friendliness, reliability, etc.)

- Choice of an assembling scheme
  - Non-Excludable Modules (i.e. high cost of exclusion, low incentives to exclude) => Free but "pollution"
  - Excludable Resources
    - either free but pollution
    - or fee based (subscription)

### Dynamic Competition in Assembling


- First Step: Competition within models
  - (e.g. among "media" and among "access providers")
    - Free but "pollution" based on side revenues => Incentives to enhance audience by combining an increasing number of functions => Low integration / No exclusivity (because of incentives to minimize costs of assembling, necessity to enlarge the audience)
    - Fee based => Subscription because of the nature of the economy (fixed costs)
      => Incentives to enhance the attractiveness by combining an increasing number of functions => High integration / High quality (because of the will to provide enhanced services)

#### • Second Step: Competition between models


- Dominant player on each market: incentives to expand the market by penetrating the other's market
  - Free low quality access for the "media" company
  - Contents for the "access provider"
- Two scenarii
  - Same model for the two players (Mixed direct and indirect revenues)
  - Competition between high quality (professional) services and low-quality (massmarket) services



#### Marketing Method




## <u>Assembling Tradeoffs:</u> <u>The Relationship to the Users</u>



Factors: Costs of exclusion

### <u>The Economics of Knowledge Management:</u> <u>Collective Production and Accumulation of Public</u> Goods

- 1. The Economics of Information Sharing
- 2. Managing Incentives to Sustain the Production of Public & Club Goods



Digital Networks as Tools to Accumulate & Generate Heterogeneous Types of Knowledge

|                          | Trust                                   | Tracking and Reputation<br>Management                                    | E-Bay                                 |
|--------------------------|---|--|---------------------------------------|
| Transaction              | Matching                                | Sharing of Knowledge about<br>Capabilities and Needs                     | Amazon<br>C. Of Experience            |
| Assembling      Ognition | Risk Reduction                          | Facilitating Use by Sharing<br>Learning by Using                         | FAQs<br>Epistemic C. of<br>Users      |
|                          | Products<br>(Components)<br>Enhancement | Gathering of Information about Satisfaction & Solution                   | Hot-Lines &<br>Forum                  |
|                          | Package<br>Enhancement                  | Gathering of Information<br>about Consumption Decision<br>and Actual Use | Fidelization +<br>Tracking            |
|                          | Collective Accu. & Distrib. of K.       | Sharing of Existing Stock of<br>Knowledge and Info Goods                 | P2P<br>Open Archives<br>Epistemic Cs. |
|                          | Innovation                              | Collective Management of<br>Innovation Processes                         | OSS                                   |

## Two Dimensions to contrast DBMs according to their ability to Use and

Information Extraction & Use Hierarchically (Organization) (Organized)

Closed (=IPRs)

Spontaneous (Un-organized) Open (= Science)


Community Community Report Report Semi-Open Report Semi-Open **Knowledge Diffusion** (Rights Management)


| The "Collective" Dimension   |   |  |  |  |
|--|---|--|--|--|
| Hierarchically<br>(Organized)  | Information Extraction<br>& Use (Organization)  |  |  |  |
| Cost of efficient design<br>Agency costs   |   |  |  |  |
|  | Knowledge Diffusion<br>(Rights Management)  |  |  |  |
| Closed (=IPRs)   | Open (= Science)  |  |  |  |
| Individual Incentives<br>Tragedy of the "Anti-<br>commons" (transaction costs +<br>monopoly power) | → Spillovers (Diffusion, reduced<br>costs of access)<br>Tragedy of the commons<br>Factors: Heterogeneity in         |  |  |  |
| Info. Externalities<br>Spillovers  | the value of contributions<br>(inc. Scope) / (Formal<br>and Informal)Redundancy of effortsInstitutional Environment |  |  |  |
| Spontaneous<br>(Un-organized)  | Factors: Legitimacy of the<br>Organizer / Level of<br>Systemic Consistency of<br>Knowledge                          |  |  |  |


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### Some Examples







### Strategic Positionning

- Matching: f (dominant position)
  - first mover
  - dominance on other markets
- Assembling: f (users preferences)
  - dominance on other markets (but free/loose assembling if dominance on information aggregation)
- Knowledge Mgmt:
  - Knowledge: f (process of K generation\*)
  - Information: f (dominance on other markets)
  - \* Dispersion and measurability of contributions

Other Key ressources

### • Innovation capability... and agility


Reputation

### Two recent publications

#### INTERNET and DIGITAL ECONOMICS

Principles, Methods and Applications

Edited by Eric Brousseau and Nicolas Curien



The Review of Network Economics

a journal that publishes papers on th economics of network industries

#### "The economics of Digital Business Models"

June 2007, Vol. 6, # 2

#### Editors' foreword

Guest editors' foreword Eric Brousseau and Thierry Penard. pp 78-80 [abstract] [full text - PDF]

The Economics of Digital Business Models: A Framework for Analyzing the Economics of Platforms Eric Brousseau and Thierry Penard. pp 81-114 [<u>abstract</u>] [<u>full text - PDF</u>]

Merchant or Two-Sided Platform? Andrei Hagiu. pp 115-133 [abstract] [full text - PDF]

Bargaining and Fixed Price Offers: How Online Intermediaries are Changing New Car Transactions Michael A. Arnold and Thierry Pénard. pp 134-160 [abstract] [full text - PDF]

The Convergence between Content and Access: Internalizing the Market Complementarity Nicolas Curien and François Moreau. pp 161-174 [abstract] [full text - PDF]

Modularity and Product Innovation in Digital Markets Marc Bourreau, Pinar Dogan and Matthieu Manant. pp 175-193 [<u>abstract</u>] [<u>full text</u> <u>- PDF</u>]

Digital Business Models for Peer-to-Peer Networks: Analysis and Economic Issue

Ramayya Krishnan, Michael D. Smith, Zhulei Tang and Rahul Telang. pp 194-213 [ abstract] [full text - PDF]

"Putting Your Money Where Your Mouth Is" - A Betting Platform for Better Prediction

Fang Fang, Maxwell Stinchcombe and Andrew Whinston. pp 214-238 [ abstract ] [ full text - PDF ]

Do Open Source Developers Respond to Competition? The (LA) TEX Case Study Alex Gaudeul. pp 239-263 [ <u>abstract</u> ] [ <u>full text - PDF</u> ]

... and hopefully more to come