

THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF INTERMEDIARIES OF PERSONAL INFORMATION

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
L'Analyse économique des données personnelles Télécom-ParisTech, 16th of June 2014

ARE WE MISSING ANYTHING?





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THE AIM OF THE TALK

This talk explores a class of firms active in many different industries:

Intermediaries of Personal Information

- They collect personal information in exchange of money, goods or services
- They use personal information to create connection between goods/services and users

In information economies, connection, not scarcity, becomes the most important determinant of value


THE AIM OF THE TALK

- At what conditions can firms exploit personal information?
 - Consequences in terms of business model
- Is economic regulation treating intermediaries of personal information consistently?
 - Uneven privacy norms regulating access to and processing of personal information
 - Uncorrect understanding of competitive dynamics

Personal Information Economy













INTERMEDIARIES OF PERSONAL INFORMATION



INTERMEDIARIES OF PERSONAL INFORMATION

Microsoft®


















How do Intermediaries Create Value?

- ✓ Generating Efficiencies
- ✓ Targeted Advertising
- ✓ Predictive Analytics
- ✓ New Form of Interaction
- ✓ Data Trading



Depending on the Legal Framework

Intermediaries of Personal Information



Intermediaries of Personal Information

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Suppliers



Intermediary



Recruiting Companies



Intermediaries of Personal Information



Suppliers



Intermediary 1



Intermediary

Google

Intermediaries of Personal Information



Suppliers



Customers



Intermediary




Intermediaries of Personal Information

Relevance Nature of Significance of Condition **Support** Information **Information** Non-Online Medium Punctual Pure Functional Functional Significant Offine Statistical Non-Medium Essential Partial Information-13 Marginal Object

ECONOMIC REGULATION

Intermediation of Personal Information

- Negative Externalities
- Irrational Choice Patterns





Regulation of Privacy Competition Law

- (Un)even playing field?
- Correct understanding of the competitive dynamics?

ECONOMICS OF PRIVACY THE EARLY CHICAGO VIEW

Information is Good for the Market

Privacy Regulations is Detrimental for the Market



ECONOMICS OF PRIVACY A COMPLEXIFIED ANALYSIS

Multiple Interactions



Benefits for Consumers Depend on the type of Information Disclosed




Negative Externality



ECONOMICS OF PRIVACY

Negative Externality The Market will Produce too much Personal Information




BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS OF PRIVACY

Random Future Costs




Unknown Probability "Irrational" Choice Patterns

- ✓ Limited Information
- ✓ Complexity (also technical)
- ✓ Bounded Rationality
- ✓ Psychological biases



Individuals are likely to disclose most information in most cases

WHAT IS LAW MISSING? A CROSS-SECTORAL APPROACH



WHAT IS LAW MISSING? ACCESS TO PERSONAL INFORMATION








Email Scanning

SMS Scanning Deep Packet Inspection

WHAT IS LAW MISSING? RELEVANT MARKETS







THANK YOU!

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